Abstract. Cyber technology represents digital military capability with the purpose of causing damage to the military strength of a potential enemy. War using conventional weapons may be preceded by a strike using cyber technology. This paper introduces such technology into the theory of conflicts. The cost of war relative to the payoff from victory turns out to be crucial for the results on armament decisions. In the war game, two types of Nash equilibria may arise. One is subject to warfare while the other is not ('equilibrium of terror'), depending on the perceived cost of war. In a symmetric war game, cyber capabilities are neutral with respect to the investments in conventional weapons, but they make wars more likely. Asymmetric access to cyber technology limits the international arms race with conventional weapons. A low success probability in the cyber programme encourages exercising the cyberattack option as the enemy may not have access to cyber capability. Uncertainty of the success of a cyber programme makes countries cautious when allocating resources not only to these programmes but also in conventional armament.
INTRODUCTION
In June and July of 2010, the world learned about Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm believed to be jointly created by American and Israeli cyber weapon specialists.
1 Experts have been convinced that Stuxnet was meant to sabotage the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in Iran and its centrifuge operational capacity, but the damage spread to other units, too. It is believed that most of the infected computers worldwide by Stuxnet have been in Iran. Judging from such a cyber operation, Israel apparently preferred to mount a cyberattack rather than a military strike on the nuclear facilities of Iran. There is little downside to such an attack because it would be virtually impossible to prove who did it. Although the attack against Iran was a success, the same is not true of the corresponding attempts to cause damage to the nuclear programme of North Korea. It is conceivable that such strikes have been planned and even attempted. With computerized instruments like Stuxnet, the world has entered into a new age, the era of cyber war. 2 Cyber issues are rapidly growing in importance to defence alliances. At the Wales Summit in 2014, allied heads of state and government affirmed that cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence. Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO's assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, gave a statement about NATO's efforts to improve its cyber defences against emerging threats.
3 The message is that by treating cyberspace as an operational domain, NATO aims to better protect its missions and operations. It will assist in the management of resources, skills and capabilities, and will also ensure that cyber defence is better reflected in military planning, exercises, training, and how NATO responds to crises. One of the questions is whether Article 5 would be triggered in the case of a cyberattack on a member country. Until recently, the political impact of cyberspace was thought to be a matter of low politics -background conditions and routine processes and decisions. Now, however, experts have begun to recognize its effect on high politics -national security, core institutions and critical decision processes. Choucri (2012) investigated the implications of this new cyberpolitical reality for international relations theory, policy, and practice, and the modes of cyber conflict and cyber cooperation in international relations.
Contests are situations in which each participant expends resources to win a valuable prize. When resorting to warfare, values and lives are destroyed. The digital world has changed warfare not only in terms of the destructive power of the weapons and direct damage to the efficient use of the technology-dependent weapons of the opponent but also indirectly causing paralysing effects on the society at large. By its logic, a cyberattack represents a pre-emptive offensive, typically a remote action employing digital technologies to damage the social and/ or military capabilities of an enemy. As cyber capability represents an instrument prior to a war with conventional weapons, modern warfare may consequently be viewed as a multi stage game. A war with conventional weapons tends to be preceded by a cyber war. A static one-stage approach, therefore, does not appear appropriate.
There are a number of excellent surveys on economic theories of conflicts, including Jackson and Morelli (2009) , Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012) , and Baliga and Sj€ ostr€ om (2013) . The theoretical literature on cyber wars employing methods commonly used in economic research, however, appears non-existent. This paper develops a theory of conflict where countries invest in both cyber technology and conventional weapons as complementary military inputs. As far as the author is aware, the current paper is the first to use a formal economic approach in the analysis of cyber war. However, the model studied in this paper has links to the literature on contests and sabotage. Cyber strike can indeed be viewed as a special kind of sabotage, as it directly reduces the effectiveness of conventional arms. Papers on sabotage include Konrad (2000) , Chen (2003) , Bevi a and Corch on (2006), Muenster (2007) , Amegashie (2012) and Chang and Luo (2017) , among others. Chowdhury and Gurtler (2015) have provided a comprehensive review of the literature on contests and sabotage and a more extensive list of references. The contestants face a single prize for the winner and a prize of lesser value for losers. They are assumed to choose an action, an 'effort' boosting the probability of winning, and an action of sabotage, reducing the probability of winning by the contestant, both determining the contest success function for each player and summing up to one.
Although our cyber war approach has a similar flavour with the economic literature on sabotage, there are differences. While the sabotage papers consider one-time decisions, our approach leads to sequential decision making with a potential first-mover advantage in terms of a pre-emptive strike. 4 The model, therefore, allows for asymmetries between the hostile countries to produce cyber capabilities. The return on cyber investment in terms of the probability of winning the war is strictly convex in its size. This is the remarkable property of the model. Convexity makes cyber technology a first-ranked military investment. In the conventional theory of conflict, the return on the investment effort in terms of the marginal increase in the probability of victory is concave and subject to diminishing returns. Moreover, while the papers on sabotage state that expectations of being sabotaged have a discouraging effect (causing the participants to reduce their effort), this is not the case in the current model.
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Access to a cyberattack raises new questions. First, how worthwhile is it to invest in conventional weapons if countries can resort to cyber instruments? Second, does the answer depend on the differences in cyber capability? Third, what are the implications for arms race and the probability of warfare? Fourth, is it always the case that a cyber war is followed by a war with conventional weapons? Fifth, does the threshold to a cyber war differ from that of a conventional war? Sixth, how much is it optimal to invest in the cyber capability if the expected success differs between the conflicting parties? These are the issues to be analysed in the current paper and some of the answers turn out to be unexpected.
The roadmap of the model world of the paper is as follows. The cost of war is first introduced in the standard model of contests, but in a non-standard way. Then, an investment in cyber technology is introduced into this model in terms of the probability of being victorious in warfare. The investment in cyber capability is considered risky in terms of the outcome of the development effort. The 4. Papers on sabotage in tournaments analyse sequential contests, see Gurtler et al. (2013) . 5. As Chowdhury and Gurtler (2015) explicate, sabotage activities are common in various contexts of life and the economy. In the soccer world, one example is the case of Lionel Messi of F.C. Barcelona: whenever he obtains the ball, the dominating strategy of the opposing team appears to stop him physically kicking his feet, as he is faster than most the other players.
outcome is private information for each country. The country that turns out to be more successful finds that it has the option of initiating a cyberattack against the enemy, but without knowing whether the enemy has been successful in its rival development effort, too. After the cyber war stage, the countries enter warfare with conventional weapons. It is a fundamental notion in the model world of this paper that the war cannot be won by a cyberattack only: conventional weapons are needed to capture the prize. The cost of war turns out to be crucial for the results. The equilibrium analysis in the war game is conditional on the cost of war relative to the payoff of being victorious. The results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, two types of Nash equilibria are possible depending on the cost of war relative to the payoff from a victory. Only one is subject to warfare. Armament in conventional weapons is equal across the two equilibria. Second, if countries expect to have access to equally effective cyber capabilities, their cyber investments are neutral with respect to the optimal investment in conventional weapons. Such a symmetric case is not necessarily typical if countries have access to different technological skills and competence to start with. The third result is therefore concerned with an asymmetric case. It is shown that hostile countries choose to invest an equal amount of resources in their militaries, even when their cyber capabilities differ, but they invest less than in the absence of cyber war technology. The fourth result is rather dramatic: cyber technologies can make the world unsafe. The intuitive reason is that technological advances in cyber capabilities lower the cost of war in conventional weapons. The fifth result adds to the concerns of the cyber war given that cyber technologies are difficult and costly. Namely, heterogeneity in the success of cyber programmes creates the option of a pre-emptive strike. It is shown that a low success probability of the cyber programme encourages exercising the cyberattack option by a successful country to be followed by warfare with conventional weapons. A successful cyber programme means a new set of beliefs of the winning probability in the conventional war. The odds have thus been changed in favour of the attacking country. Uncertainty of a cyber programme's success makes countries cautious, when allocating resources not only to these programmes but also in conventional armament.
ECONOMIC MODEL OF ARMAMENT

Conflict theory without a cyber technology
In the model world of this paper, there are two countries (players), A and B. Potentially resorting to their military power, they compete for a resource with a value of v > 0 with imperfectly specified property rights. The 'winner takes it all' principle applies if countries end up in fighting. Section 2.1 examines a complete-information simultaneous-move game with two stages.
The current section summarizes the equilibrium in the baseline model of the contest theory and provides important qualifications for it in terms of the cost of war. It also shows that depending on the perceived cost of war relative to the payoff from victory, two types of equilibria can arise.
The timeline and action space in the current section are as follows:
V. Kanniainen (i) Stage 0: both players simultaneously allocate their resources to a conventional military capacity to maximize their expected payoff. The investment costs for conventional weapons are denoted by x and y for countries A and B respectively.
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(ii) Stage 1: both countries decide whether to resolve the conflict by war.
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Section 2.1 is followed by Section 2.2, which outlines a complete-information sequential game where both or one of the players are assumed to have access to a costly cyber programme for developing cyber weapons.
Let the probabilities of winning a war in the last stage of the war game be denoted by P(A) and P(B). The well-known Tullock model predicts that the probabilities of winning a (conventional) war between two countries P(A) and P(B) are dictated by their relative military investments x and y, yielding the contest success functions
This model was suggested by Tullock (1967 Tullock ( , 1980 and it has long been the standard approach in modelling the conflicts. Subsequently, it has been discussed and elaborated by a number of authors, in particular by Hishleifer (1989) , Per ez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) , and further developed and evaluated by Nti (1997 Nti ( , 1999 , Konrad (2009); and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011) and others. 8 We notice that the marginal returns on investment are strictly concave. For example, for country A (similarly for country B),
The remarkable property of the contest success function is that the value of the marginal unit of arms for a country is related to the amount of arms acquired by the enemy. We are thereby at the source of explanation as to why the arms races arise! Quite another question is whether it is worthwhile to fight. Therefore, the model is adjusted for the costs of a mutual war if one takes place. 9 The cost 6. A linear cost is needed for technical reasons if only to solve the model analytically for the optimal conventional investment. Access to such an explicit solution is helpful to illustrate the mechanisms of the model. The cost of a cyber programme is introduced in the later section. 7. The distinction between an offensive and a defensive war is not considered. The possibility of a unilateral withdrawal will not arise. 8. As discovered by Konrad (2009) , an early solution of a structurally equivalent problem in the context of proportional competition was given by Mills (1961) . We notice that the literature has recognised the asymmetry between an offensive war and a defensive one (Arce et al., 2012) , but is not analysed in the current paper. In our model, the distinction would become relevant if the costs of war differ. Slayton (2016 Slayton ( /2017 has warned of overconfidence in the offensive advantage as it can create a 'cult of the offensive' with potentially tragic results. 9. The cost of war was also introduced in the earlier work on conflicts, cf. Baliga and Sj€ ostr€ om (2013) . However, the models with a cost of war have taken it to be constant and unrelated to the destructive power of the enemy. Once it is recognized that the cost of war results from the enemy's military capacity, it plays a more important role in the war games not discussed in the previous literature.
functions are assumed to be identical across the counties and depend on the military strength of the enemy. They will be denoted by C(y) and C(x), respectively, with
10 The expected ex ante payoffs of the war game to the countries involved are
In the two-stage war game, the solution of the last game, however, must be found first in the spirit of backward induction. Suppose for a moment that the countries A and B can settle the issue peacefully, with both obtaining half of the resource,
Þ denote the ex post payoffs to each country respectively. In such a naive trust game, neither side needs to invest in a military capacity in stage 0, x = y = 0. The outcome is Pareto efficient.
11 However, it cannot be an equilibrium if peace is not contractible and the commitment to it is not credible.
12 Both countries would have an incentive to opportunistically make an investment in arms, attacking the non-investing country to gain exclusive access to the resource. If the defender has no military capacity, the cost of war for the offensive country is zero while it is positive for the defending country. In the absence of trust between the players, both thus end up making military investments in stage 0, regardless of whether the issue is settled by war or by negotiation subsequently in stage 1.
A positive cost of war will change the argumentation. In order to highlight the effect of the cost of war on the results, assume for a moment that the cost of war is zero. As commitment to zero-investment is not credible, both invest. In stage 1, the investments are sunk and as the cost of war is zero, the countries definitively fight. The postinvestment expected payoff E 1 p i ð Þ from investments and from the subsequent warfare are
Carrying out the maximization of the expected returns (3) and (4) with respect to investments in stage 0 and subject to C y ð Þ ¼ C x ð Þ ¼ 0, the reaction functions are
10. The purpose of a cyberattack is to destroy part of the military capacity of the enemy. In the subsequent sections, the damage effect will be introduced in the expressions for the cost of war. 11. The question has been raised in the literature as to why perfectly rational agents do not peacefully negotiate outcomes and why would they sometimes fight costly wars. The Coase theorem seems to rule out wars as free negotiation should lead to a surplus-maximising outcome. The question then is whether the conditions for the Coase outcome are valid. Such thought leads to analyses on imperfect commitment and incomplete information, starting with Brito and Intriligator (1985) and surveyed by Baliga and Sj€ ostr€ om (2013). 12. Jackson and Morelli (2009) point out that commitment problems are probably the single most pervasive reason for bargaining failure.
V. Kanniainen
Then, the Nash equilibrium in investments in conventional weapons is given by a pair (x 0 , y 0 ), satisfying
Natural as it is, the optimal investment is less than the available prize, v 4 \v: A high prize v justifies a high investment. It follows that both countries have the same probability of winning the war, P(A) = P(B) = 1/2. In the absence of a cost of war, the countries fight, having access to an expected payoff which is solved to be v 4 as well. As the winner takes it all, the ex post payoff to the winner, however, is 3v/4 while it is Àv/4 for the loser.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium in investments is no issue. By continuity, a Nash equilibrium in investments also exists when a war is costly. Introducing the cost of war into the model, the expected ex ante returns are
It is the cost of war that results in mutual externalities in the war game. As one is looking for a Nash equilibrium of the war game, we have denoted these investments by x N and y N . It turns out that the investments in the Nash equilibrium are independent of the cost of war,
14 Abstracting from the investment costs
that are sunk in stage 1, we notice that for any cost of war, the ex post payoffs would be greater under peaceful contracting with sharing the prize than the expected payoffs from fighting,
We now complete the characterization of the equilibria. It turns out that one is subject to fighting while only the other is a no-fight equilibrium. The reason for fighting is the absence of a commitment to share the prize. Therefore, the players base their decisions on the expected return from fighting instead of from peaceful sharing. The amount of investments in those equilibria are, however, independent of whether the countries fight.
Because the investments x N ; y N À Á are sunk in stage 1, the postinvestment incentive conditions for a no-fight equilibrium, adjusted for the costs of war, are
13. The second-order conditions are satisfied as P(A) is strictly concave in x and P(B) in y. 14. The equilibrium satisfies subgame perfectness if one prefers to think the choice between peace and war in strategic terms in stage 1.
What the conditions (13) and (14) dictate is that the expected payoffs from fighting in stage 1 have to be negative, or at most zero, for a no-fight equilibrium to arise. A large cost of war relative to the available payoff then makes the players pay attention to the mutual externalities. With symmetric military strengths, surrendering is no option. The alternative to war is a peaceful sharing of the resource. For peaceful sharing of the prize, the benefit/cost ratio of fighting has to be sufficiently low,
Notice that even when the no-fight conditions are non-binding, the solution
continues to represent a Nash equilibrium in terms of investments.
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We summarize the findings as follows, Lemma 1. In the war game where hostile countries have access to conventional weapons, there can be two Nash equilibria. In both equilibria, 
Investment in arms with access to a cyber technology
Action space and assumptions
The paper now introduces cyber capability as a new warfare instrument. The action space in stage 0 is two-dimensional: both countries expecting a military confrontation invest simultaneously in both the conventional military capacity and in the cyber capability. Those investments are denoted by (x, a) for country A and by (y, b) for country B. When the model is extended to a two-instrument framework, the armament expenditures in stage 0 are given by
The success of the cyber programme is subject to uncertainty. The investment probabilistically yields a cyber capability. The outcome of the cyber programme, whether it succeeds or fails, is common knowledge both in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. In stages 2 and 3, the decisions are sequential. In stage 2, a successful country (or both if successful) decides on whether to launch a cyber attack against the enemy. In stage 3, the cyber war is potentially followed by a war with conventional weapons, provided that the expected payoff for at least one of the countries is positive. A no-fight equilibrium is another possibility. The model to be developed is an extension of the Tullock model to the case of multiple investments and sequential decision making in choosing between peace and war.
Several assumptions are introduced as follows.
15. It is appropriate to call such an equilibrium as 'an equilibrium of terror' to remind of the juxtaposition between the two world superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union during the cold war. Both invested heavily in mass destruction weapons, yet abstaining from a mutual fight against each other. 
To make the analysis tractable, simplifying additional assumptions in the model world are introduced. As the confrontation in the model world is of a one-shot type, it is assumed that:
Assumption 2. The beliefs concerning the success of the cyber programmes are exogenous Beliefs concerning the enemy's access to cyber weapons are formed in stage 0. In the current section, two scenarios on belief formation are examined. In the first, both countries are assumed to have confident expectations, not only of their own success but also of the success of the enemy in the development of cyber weapons. In the second scenario, one country expects to have a superior ability in the development of the cyber instrument. Based on such beliefs, some fundamental results will be reported.
Assumption 3. The success probability of a cyber programme is given by 0 < p < 1.
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When successful, the damage caused by country A in a cyberattack, say, on the military strength of country B, is assumed to be proportional to the scale of the cyber programme, and is given by ka where k > 0 is a parameter. Similarly, if country B is successful in the cyber programme, it can cause damage kb > 0 to the military strength of country A. The damage of a cyberattack thus depends on the scale of cyber investments (a, b).
18 The destruction power k can be small or large.
Assumption 4. With a successful cyber program, the damage effects on the military capacity of the enemy are proportional to cyber investments and are given by
What is left of the armament capacity after a successful cyberattack is thus x À kbx ¼ x 1 À kb ð Þ for country A, and y À kay ¼ y 1 À ka ð Þ for country B respectively. The analysis below is carried out under the assumption ka\1; kb\1:
16. One can think that investments in conventional weapons employ existing technologies while the cyber capability necessitates the development of new technologies with increasing costs. 17. Making the success probability dependent on the investment in the cyber programme complicates the modelling task too much. 18. In the model world of the current paper, the damage caused by a cyberattack concerns military targets as assets in the civil sector are not introduced.
Interaction between cyber and conventional armament: equal cyber capabilities
In this section, the following research agenda is developed. We suppose that both countries are simultaneously planning their investment programmes in conventional weapons, x and y, as well as their cyber programme expecting to be equally successful in creating the cyber destructive capability, ka = kb. We examine the equilibrium under different costs of war relative to the potential prize.
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The sequential decision making in the current section is as follows:
(i) Stage 0: simultaneous investments in conventional weapons and in the cyber programme take place. (ii) Stage 1: the success of the cyber programme is revealed and is common knowledge; in Section 2.2.2 both will succeed; in Section 2.2.3 only one will succeed. 
but otherwise not. In a symmetric equilibrium x c = y c and a c = b c and the condition for country A to prefer warfare is given by
Similarly for country B, the condition is
These conditions can be rewritten as benefit/cost ratios
They dictate that the cost of war cannot be too large relative to the potential prize available to make warfare worthwhile. Indeed, the value of the prize has to be more than double the cost of war, as the prize is available with a probability of ½. The conditions (20) are extensions of what was found in Section 2.1 above without cyber investment.
19. The approach is thus built to satisfy the subgame perfectness.
V. Kanniainen
The no-fight conditions are given by
In the current model, cyber strikes do not give rise to costs of war; they only destroy the value of conventional weapons. The above conditions, however, reveal that strong cyber capability in terms of large destruction power, k, or large cyber programmes when successful, a c and b c , reduce the costs of war with conventional weapons.
A question arises as to what incentives there are for cyber strikes to be undertaken before warfare with conventional weapons. A cyber strike may result in a limited destruction of conventional armament of the enemy without leading to warfare with conventional weapons. A more effective cyber strike, however, causes substantial damage invalidating the conditions (21) and (22) for a no-fight equilibrium. The case where a cyberattack is followed by warfare in conventional weapons may arise either because the conditions for no-fight above did not hold in the first place or because the cyber war enhanced the incentives for warfare by reducing the cost of war with conventional weapons. We, therefore, suggest that highly effective cyber weapons increase the case for warfare by conventional weapons (see below more on this case).
We move now to characterize the equilibrium investments in armament and in the cyber programme in stage 0. If mutual cyberattacks and warfare with conventional weapons are expected to take place in stages 2 and 3, country A knows that its enemy B invests y and that A will destroy kay of it in those stages. The subgame-perfect equilibrium in terms of investments in conventional armament and in the cyber programme then satisfies
Unlike with the analysis in Section 2.1 where cyber instruments were not available, the cost of war this time is conditional on the decisions of both countries. We first notice that the incentive for a cyber investment is strong. This is revealed by the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. The probability of winning the war is strictly convex in the size of the investment in cyber.
Proof. Taking the partial derivatives of the winning probability, say for country A, Cyber Technology and the Arms Race
There are four first-order conditions to determine the equilibrium (x c , y c , a c , b c ). Evaluating the partial derivatives, the equilibrium conditions are given by
We have denoted m ¼ x 1 À kb ð Þþy 1 À ka ð Þ: By imposing symmetry, x c = y c , a c = b c , one obtains the solution for equilibrium investments in conventional armament and conditions for equilibrium investments in cyber instruments,
What the result (29) suggests is that when countries expect to have access to equally effective cyber capabilities, their cyber capabilities are neutral with respect to the optimal investment in conventional weapons. What the result (30) suggests is that if countries expect that no war will take place with conventional weapons, they can invest less in equilibrium in the cyber capability.
The latter conclusion follows that when it is expected that no war will take place in the last stage, the cost of war is irrelevant and so is its marginal cost. Therefore, the second term on the left-hand side of (30) drops out, reducing the marginal return on cyber investment. Building a smaller cyber programme, saves costs. Although the equilibrium investments in cyber are reduced when no war is expected, another important conclusion from (30) is that the equilibrium is characterized by a positive cyber programme in equilibrium.
20 Neither country can afford to not invest in the cyber programme as such a decision would result in exploitation of the country by its enemy. The countries face a Prisoner's Dilemma. 20 . Recall that by Assumption 4, ka < 1 and kb < 1. Then, at the origin with a c = b c = 0, the marginal return on the cyber investment exceeds the marginal cost (which is zero by Assumption 1 at the origin).
We collect the results of this section: Proposition 1. (Neutrality of cyber.) When countries expect to have access to equally effective cyber capabilities, their cyber capabilities are neutral with respect to the optimal investment in conventional weapons. They are engaged in fighting with mutual cyberattacks to be followed by warfare with conventional weapons if conditions (30) hold; otherwise the equilibrium is of a no-fight type. Moreover, it is expected that even though the equilibrium is of no-fight type, it is characterized by a positive cyber programme in both countries in equilibrium.
Proof. From above.
For an intuition of the neutrality result, one should notice that the contest success functions are homogeneous of degree zero in 1 À ka ð Þ and 1 À kb ð Þ: There is a remarkable implication as hinted above. Suppose that in the absence of cyber capability, the cost of war is large for both countries. They abstract from fighting and the world is in a state of 'equilibrium of terror'. Then suppose that both countries have been able to develop highly efficient cyber weapons with large k > 0. Using a cyber strike, they are therefore able to destroy a remarkable segment of the conventional weapons of their enemies. This means that the cost of war in conventional weapons is reduced. We therefore suggest: Corollary 1. Efficient cyber capabilities make wars with conventional weapons more likely by reducing the cost of war.
If only to illustrate the optimal cyber investment in equilibrium with no expected war, introduce a quadratic cost function, say c a ð Þ ¼ 
Conditional on 1 À ð Þ Þ /@ a > 0 at a = 0, it follows that that the expected ex ante payoff is increasing at the origin. Therefore, its maximum has to be located at the smaller root, making the minimum located at the larger root.
Asymmetric cyber abilities
The symmetric case studied above is destroyed if one of the countries expects to be superior in creating the cyber capability while the other country expects to be inferior in its cyber capability.
22 With homogenous cyber capabilities, it was found above that the access to a mutual cyber attack is neutral with respect to the action space concerning the investment in conventional weapons. With non-homogenous cyber capabilities such a strong result, is not available. However, the following unexpected result is reported.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium with subgame perfection, countries with superior and inferior cyber abilities have incentives to invest an equal amount in conventional weapons, but less relative to the case when cyber technology is not expected to be available for either of them.
cyber capability can economise in its arms investment because it knows that part of the military capacity of its enemy can be destroyed. Furthermore, even with this knowledge, the best response of the enemy with the more limited cyber capability is to invest the same amount as the country with the superior cyber technology. However, it is the superior country that has the greater probability of winning the war
According to Proposition 2, country B ends up investing the same amount as the superior country A, even knowing that its probability of winning the war will be smaller. To make sure, the marginal values of the armaments for both countries are equalized in equilibrium with the marginal costs,
Ask then: does the superior country have an incentive to invest in its cyber programme more or less than in the case where the countries can develop symmetric capabilities? The incentive conditions for the symmetric case were given in (27) and (28). When the country B abstains from the cyber programme while country A builds such a programme, the optimality condition for country A is given by
Comparing the expected returns, it is easy to see that
Therefore, Corollary 2. In the case of asymmetric cyber capabilities, the superior country has an incentive to invest more in its cyber programme when compared with the case of equal capability.
Intuitively, the more capable country is able to raise its probability of winning the war after completing the cyberattack while it cannot expect such a bonus when the countries are symmetric and face the same probability of winning the war.
From the above analysis under asymmetric cyber abilities, a conclusion analogous to Lemma 1 arises. Although there is a mutual cutback in the armament in conventional weapons, a war with conventional weapons is not eliminated. In contrast, it follows that its probability of winning the war. This makes a cyberattack initiated by the superior country more likely to be followed by warfare in conventional weapons.
CYBERATTACK AS A FIRST-MOVER PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE
Uncertainty of the success of the enemy
This section considers a cyberattack as an option to a pre-emptive strike arising from potential asymmetry in the development success of the cyber programme. The action space in stage 0 is again two-dimensional: both countries expecting a military confrontation invest in both the conventional military capacity and in the cyber capability. The beliefs concerning the enemy's access to cyber weapons are formed in stage 0. We let p > 0 denote the success probability of a cyber programme, assumed to be common knowledge. Following the cyber investments, there are four possible outcomes from the ex ante perspective to be revealed in stage 1: with probability pp, both succeed in their cyber programmes; with probability p(1Àp), one succeeds while the other does not; and with probability (1Àp) (1Àp), neither succeeds. A success is private information and unobservable. The case of information asymmetry arises. In stage 1, the game analyzed is therefore turned into one in incomplete information as the success in the programme is private information. The successful player does not know the type of enemy in this round but has beliefs of its type. Moreover, and as a consequence, it expects either a high or low cost of war. In stage 2, a successful country decides on whether to launch a cyberattack against the enemy. The decision is conditional on the beliefs of the success of the enemy. In stage 3, a war based on conventional weapons takes place if the cyberattack has taken place.
The sequential decision making in the current section is as follows: Intuitively, when a country has succeeded in its cyber programme, a firstmover strike in stage 2 can be particularly attractive when the success probability 23. The equilibrium to be studied is the Perfect Bayesian one although the revelation about which of the two countries was able to develop the cyber weapon in stage 2a does not affect the subsequent decision of entering into warfare with conventional weapons. A cyberattack increases the likelihood of the warfare but cannot reduce it.
p is low. This is because if A has succeeded, it expects that B has been successful at most with a low probability. This suggests that the incentive of carrying out the first-mover attack may be high when the ex ante success probability is small. Consider the reasoning of country A, which has been successful in its cyber programme. In stage 2a, it has beliefs that country B will be successful with probability p and unsuccessful with probability 1-p. The behaviour of country B in stage 2b reveals whether it has cyber capability, too.
Starting with stage 3, country A knows from the previous stage whether country B was also successful in its cyber programme. In the spirit of backward induction, if both were successful and had launched a mutual cyber strike in Stage 2, warfare with conventional weapons takes place in stage 3 if
but otherwise not. In the latter case, there will be a peaceful sharing of the resource. As the equilibrium is symmetric and the investments x* = y*, a* = b* are bygone in stages 2 and 3, the conditions for warfare are
L ike in the earlier sections, these conditions are in a symmetric equilibrium again reduced to
If the cyber weapons are weak (small k) a mutual cyber strike is futile if warfare in conventional weapons is not expected. If the cyber weapons are strong (larger k) a mutual cyber strike reduces the threshold for the war in conventional weapons. Whether the threshold is reached depends on the cost of war function C : ð Þ. To analyse the decision making in stage 2a, country A has to decide whether to launch a cyberattack against country B knowing that country B with cyber capability will retaliate with a cyber counterattack followed by warfare with conventional weapons in stage 3. It is optimal for country B to retaliate if it has the cyber capability because it knows that in stage 3, warfare with conventional weapons definitively takes place. Then, let E 2 p A0 ð Þ denote the expected payoff on a cyber attack of country A in stage 2a on the condition that country B has also been successful in its cyber programme, therefore retaliating in stage 2b.
Let E 2 p A1 ð Þ denote the expected payoff on a cyberattack by country A in stage 2a based on the perceived first-mover advantage under the presumption that Cyber Technology and the Arms Race © 2018 German Economic Association (Verein f€ ur Socialpolitik) e539 country B has not been successful and that warfare takes place in stage 3:
Clearly,
With its investments (x Ã ; a Ã ) as bygone, the incentive condition for country A to exercise its option to initiate a cyber attack in stage 2a to be followed by the warfare in conventional weapons is given by
As both countries are fully symmetric in stage 0 ending up with the same investment decisions, we insert x* = y* and a* = b* in (41) and in (42) in stage 2. Then inserting (41) and (42) into (43), the condition for exercising the attack option under uncertainty can be developed in terms of the threshold value of the success probability,
So far, we have considered the case where it was country A that was successful in its development of cyber technology while it was uncertain whether country B was also successful. In an analogous way, country B faces the very same problem in stage 2. Whether country B, if successful, uses the technology in stage 2a, a similar condition analogous to (44) holds. Country A anticipates this behaviour understanding, however, that B will refrain from using this technology for the same reason if A refrains: the game is symmetric. This is precisely the case when the analogous condition (43) does not hold for country B. If the probability of the enemy's success is greater, p > p*, the best move is to not exercise the attack option. The expression (44), although somewhat complicated yet allows one to conclude the following in the cyber war stage:
We report: Proposition 3 A low success probability of the cyber programme, p p Ã ; encourages exercising the cyberattack option by a successful country to be followed by warfare in conventional weapons. The threshold value p* is positively related to the prize of warfare v while it is negatively related to the perceived cost of war C(.).
The result is logical: a country that has been able to acquire the cyber capability knows that the enemy may have a similar capability but with a small probability.
A convenient interpretation of a success in the cyber programme is available in the current model: it means a new set of beliefs of the winning probability in V. Kanniainen less than one. This outcome is analogous to the result in the contest theory suggesting that investments are the highest when players are homogenous.
To see the conclusion, evaluate the first-order condition of (46) with respect to the cyber investment a, impose the symmetry conditions x Ã ¼ y Ã ; a Ã ¼ b Ã ; and arrive at the extension of (27),
Recalling again that making the marginal return on cyber investment less than in the case of predictable outcome with p = 1. We collect the findings, Proposition 4. Although the cyber weapons are an attractive military weapon by their ability of destroying the usefulness of the military armament of an enemy, the cyber programmes are expensive and subject of uncertainty. This makes countries cautious in allocating money to these programmes. Moreover, allocating money to these programmes makes the countries allocate less in the conventional armament. Although uncertain, it is possible and certainly not excluded that a cyber programme may be a success. Then, less invested is needed in conventional armament because part of the military capacity of the enemy can be expected to be destroyed by the cyber weapons.
FINAL REMARKS
The current paper has established some regularities concerning modern warfare. The key results can be summarized as follows. The role of the cost of war relative to the payoff from victory appears decisive for the characterization of peace and war in equilibrium. When extended to the case of access to cyber technology, the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric cases in cyber capabilities becomes important. If countries expect to have access to equally effective cyber capabilities, their cyber capabilities are neutral with respect to the optimal investment in conventional weapons. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, countries with superior and inferior cyber abilities have incentives to invest an equal amount in conventional weapons, but this is less relative to the case when cyber technology is not expected to be available for either of them. This is good news. Unfortunately, a successful cyber programme appears to increase the likelihood of war by lowering the cost of war with conventional weapons. Moreover, a low success probability V. Kanniainen of the cyber programme encourages the successful country to exercise its cyber capability to exercise the attack option to be followed by warfare in conventional weapons. Uncertainty of the success of a cyber programme makes countries cautious in allocating resources not only to these programmes but also to conventional armament. The reason for the latter result is this: although uncertain, a cyber programme may be a success. Then, less needs to be invested in conventional armament because part of the military capacity of the enemy can be expected to be destroyed by the cyber weapons.
In the Georgian war, both cyberattack and conventional weapons were involved. Stuxnet made cyber war a reality in modern warfare. A cyberattack may have its limits for several reasons. The success of Stuxnet was conditional on several flaws in the cyber security of Iran. Moreover, once a cyberattack is accomplished, such an operation reveals information to the target country, which may benefit from reverse engineering of the cyber instrument used in the operation.
In the Stuxnet attack, conventional weapons were not employed. Many observers believe that the attacks against the Iranian nuclear stations by the Stuxnet virus were undertaken by Israel. Why did the country abstain from an attack with conventional weapons? To explain why the Stuxnet attack did not lead to a war with conventional weapons requires an interpretation of the prize available which is different from the one studied in the present paper. If the cyberattack is effective enough in its destruction power, it may represent a sufficient prize itself.
